Abstract. The epistemic modals possible, probable, likely, and certain require a semantics which treats them both as modal operators and as gradable adjectives. An analysis of these items in terms of Kennedy & McNally (2005) 's theory gradability suggests that they are associated with a single, fully closed scale of possibility. An implementation using the standard (Kratzerian) theory of modality is shown to make incorrect predictions in several domains. However, if the scale of possibility is identified with standard probability, the facts about gradability are explained and the undesirable predictions of Kratzer's theory are avoided.
Gradable Modals
Most discussion of the semantics of English modals has focused on the meanings of modal auxiliaries such as must, should, and can, illustrated in (1).
(1) a. Harry should be in Sacramento by now.
b. My brother can bench press 250 pounds.
c. All cameras must be checked at the door.
However, English also has a substantial number of adjectival modals such as likely, obligatory, able, and evident. These items are readily gradable, just like the large and well-studied class of gradable adjectives. Some examples are given in (2a)-(2d).
(2) a. Degree Modification:
It is very likely that Jorge will win the race.
b. Comparison:
It is more likely that Jorge will win the race than it is that Sue will win.
c. Degree questions:
How likely is it that Jorge will win the race?
d. Explicit Degree Quantification: It is 95% certain that Jorge will win the race.
As Yalcin (2007) and Portner (2009) note, it should be possible given these facts to use existing theories of the semantics of gradable adjectives such as Kennedy & McNally (2005) , Kennedy (2007) to constrain our theory of epistemic modality. Steps in this direction have been taken by Portner (2009) and Yalcin (2010b) . The present paper is a contribution to this small but growing literature, focusing on the gradable epistemic modals (GEMs) possible, probable, likely, and certain. After introducing the scale-based theory of Kennedy & McNally (2005) , I analyze the behavior of these GEMs with respect to various tests for adjective type and scale structure, showing that their differences in behavior follow from their differing locations on a single scale of possibility, one that has both top and bottom elements.
Since the standard theory of modality (Kratzer 1981 , Kratzer 1991 ) is built around a notion of comparative possibility, we might expect this to form the basis of the scales in question. However, I argue, this approach makes incorrect predictions about the ratio and proportional modifiers and about the interaction of disjunction with equatives. An alternative is to suppose with Yalcin (2010b) that GEMs are associated with the scale of standard numerical probabilities. I show that this assumption explains the behavior of GEMs with respect to tests for scale structure, and avoids Kratzer's problems with quantitative expressions of likelihood and with disjunction.
Kennedy & McNally's Theory of Gradability

Measure Functions and Degree Modifiers
According to Kennedy & McNally (2005) (K&M, see also Kennedy (2007) ), gradable adjectives denote measure functions, i.e. functions from individuals to points on a scale. The nature of the scale is (at least partially) determined by the lexical semantics of the adjective in question. So, for example, tall denotes a function from an object to its height. 1 Formally, a scale is given by a triple D, h, δe, where D is a set of degrees, h is a total ordering of D, and δ is the dimension of the adjective (e.g., in the case of tall, the dimension of height). The meaning of tall is as in (3): (3) tall λx.ιd.x's height = d
When an adjective has an explicit degree modifer, the adjective is an argument of the modifier, as in (4).
Hence The door is completely closed means that the degree of closure of the door is the maximal degree in D closed . This predicts immediately that we cannot use completely on its degree-modifier reading with an adjective associated with a set of degrees with no maximal element -a correct prediction, as we will see. Gradable adjectives in this theory denote functions from individuals to degreesnot the right type for a predicate, of course. K&M argue that when an adjective is used in the positive form, it is converted into a predicate by a null morpheme pos, which supplies a standard of comparison s A .
(5) a. pos λA.λx.Ax i s A 1 Alternatively we might take adjectives to denote functions from individuals to intervals on a scale (Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002 , Kennedy 2001 , or from degrees to sets of individuals (Heim 2001) . The choice between these options is not crucial for current purposes.
How s A is determined is a complex issue which we won't address here; see Kennedy & McNally (2005) , Kennedy (2007) for much discussion.
Parameters of Variation: Scale Structure and Adjective Type
One of the most important parameters of variation among gradable adjectives, according to K&M, is the structure of the domain of degrees D. They distinguish four types of scales: totally open, totally closed, upper bounded, and lower bounded. A totally open scale can be thought of as one that goes to infinity in either direction, while a totally closed scale has a finite minimum and maximum. The other two scale types receive the obvious interpretations. However, since the range (ª, ª) is isomorphic to the range (0,1), K&M use the latter to represent a totally open scale. Likewise, any (continuous) totally closed scale can be rescaled to [0, 1] , and similarly for lower closed scales with [0,1) and upper closed scales with (0,1].
A closely related parameter of variation is adjective type. K&M discuss three types, the maximum-standard, minimum-standard, and relative-standard adjectives. Maximum-standard adjectives like full by default pick out the top portion of a scale: for example, a glass is full just in case it cannot contain any more liquid. Maximum-standard adjectives must be associated with a scale with a top element, i.e. an upper-closed or fully-closed scale, then. Minimum-standard adjectives like bent pay attention to the lower portion of a scale: something counts as bent if its degree of bend is non-zero (i.e., if it is not straight). This requires that bent and other minimum-standard adjectives are associated with a lower-closed or fully-closed scale. Finally, relative-standard adjectives like tall and happy have a value that is more context-dependent, but falls somewhere in the mid-range of the scale. Typically they are associated with scales without a top element (as with tall), although, I will argue, this is not always the case (cf. discussion of inexpensive and lightweight below).
Tests for Adjective Type and Scale Structure
This subsection presents seven tests for adjective type and scale structure which we will use to consider the GEMs. (There are many more, but using more would not affect the conclusions we will reach when we turn to GEMs; see Lassiter (2010b) for more detailed discussion of these and more tests for scale structure with GEMs.) Except where noted, tests are from Kennedy & McNally (2005) or Kennedy (2007) .
1. Completely-modification. Completely is a polysemous modifier, but one common function is as a maximizer. K&M argue that, if an adjective can be modified by completely with a "maximum" interpretation, it is a maximum-standard adjective, and thus denotes a function whose range is an upper closed scale. This explains the contrast in (6), where bent and tall are unacceptable with degree-modifying completely because their scales do not have a maximum element.
(6) a. The room is completely full.
b. # This basketball player is completely tall. c. # The rod is completely bent.
2. Slightly-modification. According to K&M, x is slightly A is true just in case A x differs by a small amount from the minimum degree on the scale associated with A. Thus if an adjective can be modified by slightly, it is associated with a scale with a bottom element, and, in generally, is a minimum-standard adjective.
(7) a. The rod is slightly bent.
b. # This player is slightly tall. c. # The room is slightly full.
3. "A but could be A-er": Minimum-standard and relative-standard adjectives allow the construction in (8), but maximum-standard adjectives do not.
(8) a. The rod is bent, but it could be more bent.
b. This basketball player is tall, but he could be taller. c. # The room is full, but it could be fuller.
Note that neither of these tests tells us whether the scale in question is merely upper closed or is fully closed -it simply indicates that the adjective in question is maximumstandard and is associated with the a scale which has a maximum element. 4. Negation entails antonym? Minimum-and maximum-standard adjectives share the property that their negation entails that their antonym holds. Relative-standard adjectives have a "zone of indifference" (Sapir 1944 ), so that it is possible to be neither A nor notA if A is relative-standard.
(9) a. The rod is not bent. à The rod is straight.
b. The rod is not straight. à The rod is bent.
c. This player is not tall. à This player is short.
5. Type of antonym. The defining characteristic of antonymous pairs of adjectives is that x is more A pos than y is true iff y is more A neg than x is true. I will assume that antonymy simply involves reversing the direction of the ordering relation. 2 It follows that the maximum element of a scale, if there is one, is always the minimum element of its antonym, and vice versa (see Rotstein & Winter (2004) for much discussion).
As a result, maximum-standard adjectives have minimum-standard antonyms (10) and vice versa (11):
(10) a. This neighborhood is completely/#slightly safe.
b. This neighborhood is slightly /#completely dangerous.
(11) a. The rod is slightly/#completely bent. b. The rod is completely/#slightly straight.
However, the antonym of a relative adjective is also a relative adjective, as (12) shows.
(12) a. My car was #completely/#slightly expensive. b. My car was #completely/#slightly cheap.
6. Almost. If an object is almost A, then it fails to be A by a small margin. Rotstein & Winter (2004) show that almost can only be used with maximum-standard adjectives, and, when acceptable, x is almost A entails that the antonym of A with slightly holds of x:
(13) The neighborhood is almost safe. à The neighborhood is slightly dangerous.
7. Proportional Modification. Proportional modifiers like half, 70%, and mostly quantify the difference between a degree's location on the scale relative to both the maximum and minimum points. If either of these points does not exist, then the modifier will be unacceptable. For example:
Thus, as K&M show, these modifiers occur only with adjectives such as full which are associated with a fully closed scale.
(15) a. The glass is half full/empty. b. # My cousin is half tall/short. c. # This road is half dangerous/safe.
In most cases proportional modifiers will be natural only with maximum-standard adjectives, the type most frequently seen with fully closed scales. However, they may be (marginally) acceptable with other types of adjectives which are on fully closed scales, see below.
The Scale Structure of Gradable Epistemic Modals
Our first task is to figure out where each of our GEMs falls in K&M's typology, and what the nature of the scale or scales in question is. Seth Yalcin, in unpublished work 3 , has suggested that possible and probable are probability operators, i.e. that they map propositions to the range of standard probabilities 0, 1¥. This predicts that at least these two GEMs should be associated with a fully closed scale. On the other hand, Portner (2009) has claimed that, since possible and probable accept different degree modifiers, this shows that they are associated with different scales. Portner suggests that this approach is more congenial to the standard (non-probabilistic, nonquantitative) Kratzerian semantics for modality.
In this section I re-examine the degree modification facts systematically, showing that the Portner's conclusion is too quick. Data regarding degree modification, as well as entailments and scalar implicatures, suggest that the GEMs possible, probable, likely, and certain are located on the same scale, and that this scale is fully closed. This does not, of course, decide the question of whether probability is implicated, which is the subject of the following sections.
Possible
On all of our tests, possible behaves as a minimum-standard adjective.
(16) a. #It is completely possible that the Jets will win. b. It is slightly possible that the Jets will win. c. It is possible that the Jets will win, but it could be more possible. 4 d. It is not possible that the Jets will win. à It is impossible that they will.
e. It is completely/#slightly impossible that the Jets will win. f. #It is almost possible that the Jets will win. g. #It is half possible that the Jets will win.
Since possible is a minimum-standard adjective, we expect, to a first approximation, the following truth-conditions: (17) φ is possible is true iff φ's degree of possibility is not minD poss (i.e., if it is non-zero).
And, of course, this means that the scale of possibility must have a minimum element.
Scale-Mates, Entailments, and Implicatures
As Portner (2009) What (18) shows, rather, is that possible and probable do not have the same adjective type: as we have seen, possible is a minimum-standard adjective, and so probable must be one of the types that do not accept slightly-modification, i.e. relative-or maximumstandard. Furthermore, there are entailment relations and implicatures between possible and probable that are straightforwardly explained if probable occupies a higher position on the same scale.
(20) a. It is probable that we will win. à It is possible that we will win. b. It is not possible that we will win. à It is not probable that we will win. This is the usual behavior of scalar items like warm and hot: It is hot entails It is warm, and It is not warm entails It is not hot (putting aside metalinguistic negation). Possible and probable also behave like warm and hot with respect to scalar implicatures:
(21) a. It is possible that we will win. It is not probable that we will win. b. It is not probable that we will win.
It is possible that we will win.
The simplest explanation of these facts is that possible and probable occupy different regions of a single scale of possibility, just as warm and hot occupy different regions of the temperature scale.
Probable and Likely
I treat probable and likely together because I have not identified any significant semantic differences between them. However, probable does seem to belong to a more formal/technical register, and there are of course considerable syntactic differences. Given that probable and likely are scalemates of possible, but are not minimumstandard adjectives, we can now ask whether they are relative-or maximum-standard adjectives. Uniformly, they behave as relative-standard adjectives on our tests: (22) a. #It is completely likely/probable that the Jets will win this year. 6 b. #It is slightly likely/probable that the Jets will win. c. It is likely that the Jets will win, but it could be more likely. d. It is not likely/probable that the Jets will win, but it is not unlikely/improbable either. 7 e. It is #completely/#slightly unlikely/improbable that the Jets will win. f. #It is almost likely/probable that the Jets will win. g. #It is half likely/probable that the Jets will win.
However, in contrast with the relative adjective tall, modification of likely/probable by n% is quite common in corpora:
(23) It is 70% likely that the Jets will win.
An explanation of this difference will emerge in the following subsection: likely, unlike tall, is associated with a scale with a maximum element. All of this suggests the following rough truth-conditions for possible and likely:
(24) φ is likely/probable is true iff φ's degree of possibility is greater than s poss (the contextually determined standard, cf. (5)).
Certain
Similar reasoning about entailment and implicature suggests that certain occupies the same scale as probable and likely:
(25) a. It is certain that we will win. à It is likely that we will win. b. It is not likely that we will win. à It is not certain that we will win.
c. It is likely that we will win. It is not certain that we will win. d. It is not certain that we will win.
It is likely that we will win. 8
On all of our tests, certain behaves as a maximum-standard adjective:
(26) a. It is completely certain that the Jets will win. b. #It is slightly certain that the Jets will win. c. #It is certain that the Jets will win, but it could be more certain.
d. It is not certain that the Jets will win. à It is (at least a little bit) uncertain.
e. It is slightly uncertain that the Jets will win. f. It is almost certain that the Jets will win. g. It is half/95% certain that the Jets will win.
These facts suggest the following rough truth-conditions:
(27) φ is certain is true iff φ's degree of possibility is maxD poss .
And, since certain is maximum-standard, we know that the scale of possibility must have a maximum element.
Failure to Maximize with Completely
Portner (2009) points out an interesting problem with the claim that the GEMs occupy a single scale: if we take K&M's theory literally, the current proposal predicts that completely possible and completely probable should have the meanings in (28).
(28) a. φ is completely possible is true iff φ's degree of possibility maxD poss b. φ is completely probable is true iff φ's degree of possibility maxD poss
That is, completely possible and completely probable should both mean the same thing as certain. Since this is evidently false, Portner concludes, as already mentioned, that these adjectives do not occupy the same scale. The problem that Portner points out is real, but it is a general problem for the K&M theory of gradability. In fact, Kennedy (2007) points out effectively the same issue with respect to (29a) and (29b), which, on intuitive assumptions, should be equivalent; (30) gives another example.
(29) a. This pizza is completely inexpensive.
b. This pizza is free.
(30) a. On that planet, you would be completely lightweight. b. On that planet, would be weightless.
Although Portner's point is valid, the conclusion that he draws from it is not: we cannot conclude that probable does not have an upper-closed scale, any more than we can conclude that inexpensive does not. 9 In fact, we can extract from (28b)-(30) an important generalization: in each case, a relative adjective fails to maximize with completely when there is a maximum-standard adjective (free, weightless, certain) occupying the endpoint of the scale. Likewise, in (28a) the minimum-standard adjective possible fails to maximize in the same situation. We could interpret these facts as supporting any of the following generalizations:
(31) a. Relative-and minimum-standard adjectives cannot be modified by degreemaximizing completely even if their scale is upper closed. b. Relative-and minimum-standard adjectives whose scale is upper closed cannot be modified by degree-maximizing completely if there is a maximumstandard adjective on the same scale.
9 Kennedy (2007, p.35 ) actually does draw this conclusion, I think erroneously. He claims that, although "naive intuition suggests that the COST scale should have a minimal value representing complete lack of cost", data like (29) show that it does not: "Instead, the property of zero cost is named by the non-gradable adjective free".
The claim that free is non-gradable is surely incorrect, though. For example, completely free and almost free are acceptable. This indicates that free is a maximum-standard adjective, and its behavior on other tests show that it is on a scale with a maximum but no minimum, as expected. Further, since an object is almost free just in case its cost is very low but greater than zero, the scale is question must be the scale of costs; so we must look for another explanation of (29). In any case, gerrymandering scale structure to fit the degree-modification data is not good approach in general -scales need some plausible psychological or ontological basis in order to be explanatory. c. Relative-and minimum-standard adjectives only occur on upper-closed scales if there is a maximum-standard adjective on the same scale (which then blocks degree-modifying completely).
The data do not yet allows us to choose between these options, but it seems that one of the generalizations in (31) is needed to explain (28)-(30). However these data are explained, though, it does not seem that (28) motivates placing the various GEMs on separate scales. And, of course, if we were to do so we would lose the explanation of the various entailments and implicatures noted above.
The Big Picture
The overall picture that emerges is this: GEMs are functions from propositions to points on a single scale of possibility. This scale is fully closed and contains the minimum-standard adjective possible, the relative-standard adjectives probable and likely, and the maximum-standard adjective certain. These behave as expected with respect to degree modification, entailments, and implicatures. 10 Many important questions remain, in particular detailed issues regarding exactly how the value of the contextually given value of likely and probable is determined; see Yalcin (2010b) and Lassiter (2010b) for discussion.
Semantics for Epistemic Modals: The Standard Theory
The standard theory of modality among linguists is due to Angelika Kratzer (Kratzer 1981 , Kratzer 1991 ). This theory is built around a notion of comparative possibility, making it a very promising candidate to supply a degree semantics for GEMs. This section outlines the basic properties of such an approach, and then notes two serious problems that arise.
The Basic Theory
Kratzer's theory of modality is built around a binary relation on worlds m which holds of two worlds u, v just in case u is "at least as possible" than v in a way to be made precise. 11 m is interpreted relative to a modal base f and an ordering source g. f is a function which, given a world, returns a set of propositions that are relevant to the evaluation of the modal expression. In the case of epistemic modality, the modal base is the set of propositions known to the speaker (or whoever else the contextually appropriate people are).
The ordering source g is a function which, applied to a world w, returns a set of propositions which induces a partial order over the worlds in fw according to which of the propositions in g(w) they satisfy. The ordering is determined by the rule in (32): (32) For all u, z:
That is, world u is at least as good as world z relative to gw iff u satisfies every proposition in g(w) that z does. u is strictly better, u i z, iff u m gw z and 2z m gw u.
The highest-ranked (ideal) worlds, if any, are those in gw.
(From here on I will mostly suppress reference to g(w) for readability's sake, since variation in the ordering source will not be important.) Comparative possibility can be extended to a relation on propositions as in (33) φ m s ψ can be read as "φ is at least as likely as ψ". The strict comparative relation ("φ is more likely than ψ") is defined as:
Extension to Gradable Epistemic Modals
A minimal modification of Kratzer's theory to account for gradable epistemic modals might run along the following lines. We know that the scale is fully closed. Furthermore, K&M's theory requires that the domain of degrees D be totally ordered: for any d, d
This is crucially not true of the relation m s , which is a mere partial order. One approach might be to weaken K&M's theory to allow for mere partial orders (cf. Szabolcsi & Zwarts (1993) and Lassiter (2010a) for arguments that this is needed). Here I will follow a simpler approach by defining the class of admissible epistemic possibility functions µ that satisfy the requirements of K&M's theory and the results of section 3, leaving the choice of µ underdetermined. 12 However, just like m s , µ contains no meaningful quantitative information: for example, the ratio of µφ to µψ, or their difference, is not stable across functions satisfying (35), unless φ and ψ are equally likely.
Problems with the Degree-Based Extension
The degree-based variant of Kratzer's theory just outlined does the job it was designed to do: it accounts for locutions of the form "φ is more likely than ψ", "φ is at least as likely as ψ", and so on. However, there are a number of problems with the approach due to the lack of meaningful quantitative information contained in m s and the class of epistemic possibility functions it defines. I will mention two of them here.
The first set of problems to note involve degree modifiers which require quantitative comparisons of likelihood. For example, all of the expression-types in (36) make reference to quantitative comparisons, either between two propositions or between a proposition and the maximum and/or minimum.
(36) a. φ is twice as likely as ψ.
b. It is half certain that φ. c. It is 95% certain that φ.
Since quantitative information is not stable across different choices of µ, for any µ that would make the sentences in (36) true, we can choose a µ that would make the same sentences false while still respecting the underlying comparative possibility relation. (In measurement-theoretic terms (Krantz, et al. 1971) , quantitative statements like those in (36) are formally MEANINGLESS because m s defines an ordinal scale, so that all monotone increasing transformations of µ are admissible as long as the maximum and minimum are held constant.)
A second major problem holds not only for the degree-based theory suggested here, but also for the original account. Both versions of Kratzer's theory predicts the validity of an important class of inferences involving disjunction which are not intuitively valid.
(37) The Disjunctive Inference a. φ is at least as likely as ψ.
theory to implement (cf. van Rooij (2009) for relevant considerations). The reason for not giving more detail, or attempting to choose between the various ways to set up the semantics here, is that I will quickly abandon the approach due to problems that all of its variants share.
b.
φ is at least as likely as χ. c. φ is at least as likely as (ψ E χ). The problem is that the inference pattern in (37) is intuitively invalid; this is particularly clear when this schema is applied repeatedly. 14 To see why, suppose someone tells you that (38) is true:
Proof of (37)
(38) "The Bluejays are at least as likely to win the Series as any other team is." This is obviously a weaker claim than (39):
(39) "The Bluejays are as likely to win as they are not to win." But on Kratzer's theory, (38) plus a few simple facts about baseball actually . This is of course unacceptable: the weaker statement should not entail the stronger.
Let team 1 , ..., team 29 be the other 29 Major League baseball teams. (40) is a reasonable rendition of the truth-conditions of (38):
It is at least as likely that the Bluejays will win as it is that x will win.
Let p be the proposition p = The Bluejays win, and let q n be the proposition Team n wins. Since only Major League teams can compete, (40) is equivalent to (41):
Feeding (41) into the inference schema (37), we see that (42) follows as well.
Since we know that one of the thirty teams must win, the only way that the Bluejays can lose is if someone else wins -that is, The Bluejays do not win is true iff q 1 E q 2 E ... E q 29 is true. Putting this all together, we see the problem: (38) and the rules of baseball entail (42), which is equivalent to (39). But, intuitively, (39) is clearly not an entailment of (38): in fact, it is a much stronger claim. 13 The validity of this inference is in fact built into the axioms of comparative possibility by Kratzer's predecessor Lewis (1973) and by Halpern (1997) , whose discussion is inspired by Lewis. However, the damaging consequences of the Disjunctive Inference for Kratzer's theory do not seem to have been noted in the literature until they were independently discovered by me (Lassiter 2010b) and by Seth Yalcin (Yalcin 2010b) . As Halpern notes, this property is shared by many other representations of uncertainty, e.g. possibility logic and fuzzy logic, with the same damaging consequences as far as natural language semantics is concerned.
14 See Yalcin (2010b) for related observations, and some further problems that arise when φ ¤ φ.
It is a general feature of Kratzer's system that a disjunction φ 1 E φ 2 E ... E φ n , no matter how large, can never be as likely as another proposition ψ unless one of the disjuncts φ i is itself as likely as ψ. Is this a plausible prediction about valid inferences from sentences involving likely? In the case at hand, the answer is clearly "no". Somehow, a disjunction of lower-ranked possibilities must be able, as it were, to "gang up" to overpower a higher-ranked possibility.
Both of the problems discussed in this section involve the fact that Kratzer's theory lacks QUANTITATIVE information about likelihood. This suggests that we need a semantics for comparative possibility which employs not just comparative measures, but also quantitative measures. Numerical probability, I will show, provides precisely what we need to deal with these issues.
Probabilistic Semantics for Gradable Epistemic Modals
We are looking for a logic for epistemic modals which has the following three properties: it is associated with a fully closed scale, it renders quantitative statements like those in (36) meaningful, and it does not validate the Disjunctive Inference (37). There is a well-understood logical system which fits the bill -the probability calculus.
(43) A Probability Space is a pair W, µe, where W is a set of possible worlds and µ ¢ ³W 0, 1¥ is a function from subsets of W to real numbers between 0 and 1 which satisfies the following conditions: 15 a. µW 1. b. If P W Q g, then µP V Q µP µQ.
Re-naming this µ as prob, (rough) truth-conditions for the GEMs follow immediately.
(44) a. φ is possible is true iff probφ x 0.
b. φ is likely/probable is true iff probφ e s poss .
c. φ is certain is true iff probφ 1.
And, of course, truth-conditions for comparative possibility sentences:
(45) φ is more likely than ψ is true iff probφ e probψ.
(As mentioned above, these conclusions were foreshadowed in unpublished work by Seth Yalcin mentioned in section 2 above, and to some extent in Horn (1989, ch.5) .) There are several important connections between the definitions in (43) and the theory of gradability. First, the definitions as stated entail the existence of a bottom element 0 in addition to the top element 1. Just as in K&M's theory, though, the choice of the numbers 0 and 1 to serve as minD poss and maxD poss respectively is arbitrary: any two non-negative reals will do as long as minD poss d maxD poss and the axioms are modified accordingly.
In addition, note that axiom (43b) is not a special stipulation needed for probability measures. Rather, it is a general feature of EXTENSIVE MEASUREMENT (Krantz et al. (1971) ), and holds, for example, of measurements of height, length, and fullness:
(46) a. If you place two (disjoint) boards of length m and n end-to-end, the total length is m n. b. If you have a cup that is n% full and a (different) cup of the same volume that is m% full, and you pour one into the other, the result is a cup that is n m% full.
So the definitions in (41) are not special features designed to solve the problems we observed with Kratzer's theory: they follow directly from a very general theory of measurement, on the assumption that the scale relevant to epistemic modals is fully closed. In other words, the use of probability to give scales for GEMs is a very natural, and perhaps necessary, corollary of the overall theory of measurement and the fact that GEMs have a fully closed scale. Our first desideratum is clearly satisfied: probability provides a fully closed scale. On the second issue, it is simple to give meaningful truth-conditions for the sentencetypes in (36):
(47) a. φ is twice as likely as ψ is true iff probφ 2 ! probψ.
b. It is half certain that φ is true iff probφ 0.5 ! 1 0.5. c. It is 95% certain that φ is true iff probφ 0.95. probφ g probχ c. probφ g probψ E χ
Counter-model: let probφ .3, probψ .2, probχ .2, and probψ D χ 0.
Then µψ E χ .3 .2 .5, which is greater than probφ.
Conclusion
A good theory of gradable epistemic modals should have at least these three features: it should be compatible with a good theory of the compositional semantics of gradable adjectives; it should not render valid any clearly invalid inferences; and it should predict all of the clearly valid inferences.
The standard Kratzerian theory of modality, despite its other merits, is difficult to integrate with a theory of gradability, makes demonstrably incorrect predictions about inferences involving disjunction and equatives (37), and fails to yield meaningful denotations for relatively unremarkable sentence-types like those in (36). In contrast, a theory based on probability appears to satisfy these desiderata, at least for the data we have considered: it is readily compatible with (one version of) K&M's theory of gradability, it gives denotations to the sentence-types in (36), and it does not validate (37). By all current indications, then, a probabilistic semantics is a much better option for the gradable epistemic modals considered here.
Many important questions remain unsettled, though. For instance, other gradable epistemic modals such as clear, evident, and apparent have not been addressed, and it is unclear to what extent probability is implicated in their semantics (on clear, see Barker (2009)) . A second interesting question is whether there are other natural language expressions whose semantics make reference to modality. van Rooij (1999) and Levinson (2003) , for instance, have argued that the semantics of desire verbs includes a probabilistic element, and Cohen (1999) argues that generics and frequency adverbs have probabilistic semantics.
Another interesting question that we have not addressed is whether epistemic modal auxiliaries also have a probabilistic semantics. On the one hand, parsimony considerations suggest that this is an option worth considering. On the other hand, Kratzer's theory has the not inconsiderable virtue of explaining the varied uses of modal auxiliaries like should, must, may, and ought without needing to posit massive lexical ambiguity. One option is simply to allow Kratzerian semantics for modal auxiliaries and probabilistic semantics for GEMs to exist side-by-side. A second option is to embrace probabilistic semantics for epistemic modal auxiliaries as well, and to explain their apparent non-gradability as due to syntactic restrictions. If we take this approach, we have the further burden of providing a theory that can match Kratzer's in explaining the semantic variability of modal auxiliaries without positing ambiguity. Presumably this will involve a matching scale-based theory of deontic and circumstantial modals.
Finally, there are many issues regarding the interpretation of a probabilistic analysis, including what interpretation of probability is appropriate, exactly what types of information are relevant, whether probability statements have ordinary truth-conditions (Yalcin 2010a) , and whether even probability is a rich enough representation format (Halpern 2003) .
However these questions are resolved, it seems clear that probability -or something very close to it -plays a crucial role in the semantics of at least some epistemic modals. 16 
